Thinking about "Practice" and "practices"

In week 1, we read two accounts of scientific modeling in action, in which secondary school students used computational, agent-based models to investigate a number of different complex systems. We discussed some of the immediate advantages to modeling exercises and pragmatic obstacles to implementing modeling in the K-12 classroom.

Our conversation about the affordances of modeling was directed mainly towards agent-based modeling. But Collins describes many more types of models that are used in science. Agent-based modeling is just one type of behavioral model, while Collins also lists examples of structural and functional/causal models. Not all of these models are conducive to thinking about complex systems, nor are they all equally viable as computational (i.e., programmable) models. But, the wide variety of models he names are useful for framing conversations about the range of scientific practices we want students to engage with. His article as a whole, outlining the process of scientific inquiry, complements the proposals of the Next Generation Science Standards for reforming science classrooms. Therefore, his list of models is a powerful tool for arguing for modeling throughout the science curriculum, and for evaluating potential scaffolds for instruction.

We also discussed obstacles to model implementation, one of which was the limitation of assessments to evaluate students’ thinking in relation to modeling. Standardized assessments are well designed for measuring learning from direct instruction (of bodies of factual knowledge), but they are not as well suited for measuring learning from guided discovery experiences, such as modeling (which ask students to participate through disciplinary practices). These disciplinary practices, at the heart of modeling, are the procedures and processes that Collins describes in his article as the practice of inquiry. Collins does not use “practice” in the same sense as Pickering does when he refers to “scientific practice;” in Pickering’s case, “practice” refers to the overarching scientific culture, although he uses “practices” in the plural to refer to the everyday procedures of scientists in the discipline.

As I reread Pickering, I was able to clarify a confusion that I had from one of my initial read-throughs. Originally, I recognized that Pickering has a heavy emphasis on machines when he talks about “material agency,” and I had trouble applying his theory to agent-based modeling, which typically deals with other living beings or chemical relationships found in nature (which in some sense can be brought under human control). I wonder if, when Pickering mentions human vs. nonhuman agency, what he is lumping into “non-human.”

While I agree with most of Pickering’s assumptions and find them to be useful points of analysis, I don’t think he gives enough attention to the limitations of human cognition and the individual differences between people in his account. I recognize that is a little beyond the scope of his argument, but it is necessary to consider for instructional and design purposes. If we are going to make the image of modeling presented in the Wilensky articles a wide-scale reality, we need to discuss how Pickering’s – and Collins’ – ideas can be useful for designing needed scaffolds for both teachers and students to implement modeling successfully.